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THE IMMUTABLE COMMAND MEETS THE UNKNOWABLE MIND:
DEIFIC DECREE CLAIMS AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
AFTER PEOPLE V. SERRAVO
INTRODUCTION
"[L]egal insanity combines concepts of law, morality and medicine
with the moral concepts derived primarily from the total underlying con-
ceptions of ethics shared by the community at large." Evaluating this
combination of law, morality, medicine and community ethics, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court in People v. Serravo2 held that a deific decree3 claim in
an insanity defense acts only as one factor of the sanity judgment, not as
an exception creating a presumption of insanity. 4 The Serravo decision
tips the balance between society's desire to prosecute wrongdoers and
its obligation to protect the accused, who does not possess the capacity
to understand the crime. This decision focuses on the prosecutorial as-
pect of the law and legal system by refusing to accord a proven deific
decree claim the status of a presumption of insanity.
This Comment discusses the Colorado Supreme Court's position in
People v. Serravo; a case of first impression. Part I examines the back-
ground surrounding the various insanity tests developed in both com-
mon law and codified law throughout the United States. Part I also
examines Colorado's case law and statutory development of the insanity
tests and addresses the development of the deific decree doctrine in
Colorado and other jurisdictions. Part II provides the facts of People v.
Serravo,5 and discusses the Colorado Supreme Court's holdings concern-
ing the insanity questions presented. Part III analyzes the current na-
tional status of the deific decree doctrine and reviews the Serravo
decision in light of that doctrine. This Comment criticizes the Colorado
Supreme Court's position in Serravo because the decision does not fol-
low precedent established by cases developing the deific decree doctrine
in the United States. In light of the current understanding of mental
illness and insanity, an individual who believes a deity directly com-
mands him or her to act may appreciate the wrongfulness of the act, but
is nonetheless under such deluded compulsion that the individual has
no choice but to act. This lack of choice strongly suggests a presumption
of insanity. This Comment also criticizes the holding that a deific decree
is merely one factor to be weighed and evaluated in considering a crimi-
nal defendant's sanity, rather than creating a presumption of insanity.
1. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 138 (Colo. 1992) [hereinafter Serravo I] (refer-
ences to People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) are hereinafter Serravo 1).
2. Serravo II, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992).
3. A "deific decree" claim is one in which an individual believes he or she has been
commanded by God to perform some act. The person genuinely believes a deity is speak-
ing to him or her directly. See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
4. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 128-29.
5. Serravo I, 797 P.2d at 782.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Insanity Tests
The insanity defense currently exists in four categories: the initial
M'Naghten test,6 the irresistible impulse test,7 the Durham product test
8
6. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). This test requires that a defendant act
under a mental disease or defect and not know either the nature and quality of the act or
its wrongfulness. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); Gurganus v. State, 451 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1984);
State v. Allen, 609 P.2d 219 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Laney v. State, 421 So.2d 1216 (Miss.
1982); Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1979); State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881 (Neb.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); State v. Hartley, 565 P.2d 658 (N.M. 1977); State v.
Jackson, 273 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1981); State v. Brown, 449 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1983); State v.
Law, 244 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1978); Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 272 (Va. 1974). For
a detailed discussion of M'Naghten, see also Fernand N. Dutile & Thomas H. Singer, What
Now for the Insanity Defense?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1104 (June 1983) (containing a history
of the insanity defense and its possible future developments); Jodie English, The Light Be-
tween Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 1 (1988) (discussing the effect of Insanity Reform Act of 1984 on the M'Naghten test);
Lois G. Forer, Law and the Unreasonable Person, 36 EMORY LJ. 181 (1987) (illustrating the
conflict between psychiatry and laws that are too restrictive); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257 (1987) (basis for general defenses and excuses in criminal law);
Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which Our
Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283 (1988) (reevaluation of insanity defense and
mental illness' role in modem criminal law system); Norval Morris, Ake Dah, 52 U. Cm. L.
REv. 553 (1985) (containing an anecdotal essay of a Burmese Buddhist deific decree);
Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 393
(1988) (M'Naghten applied to alcohol-induced crimes); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 599
(1989-90) (history and modernization of the insanity defense); Andrew K. Haynes &Jonas
Robitscher, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY LJ. 9 (1982) (explaining the modem
trend toward elimination of insanity defense); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication:
An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371
(1986) (underlying rationale for and history of insanity defense and M'Naghten as a cogni-
tive test); Emily Campbell, Comment, The Psychopath and the Definition of "Mental Disease or
Defect" Under the Modern Penal Code Test of Insanity. A Question of Psychology or a Question of
Law?, 69 NEB. L. REv. 190 (1990) (discussing psychopathy, knowledge, responsibility and
legal status); Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free
Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1988) (exploring various biological bases for
excuses/criminal defenses, including the postpartum depression and the "Twinkie" de-
fenses); Henry T. Miller, Comment, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity De-
fense, 46 LA. L. REv. 337 (1985) (origins and alternatives to the insanity defense);Judith A.
Morse & Gregory K. Thoreson, Comment, Criminal Law-United States v. Lyons: Abolishing
the Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177 (1984)-(illustration of
test "shift" in the Fifth Circuit and the elimination of the volitional aspect of the test);
Harry J. Philips, Jr., Comment, The Insanity Defense: Should Louisiana Change the Rules?, 44
LA. L. REv. 165 (1983) (development of the present defense and alternatives); George
Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE LJ. 1661 (1987) (early back-
ground does not provide defense or excuse; "free will" versus "determinism").
7. This test requires that an individual not be able to control his or her actions due
to impulse or controlling disease. See Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897); State v.
Hartley, 565 P.2d 658 (N.M. 1977); Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 272 (Va. 1974).
For a discussion of the "irresistible impulse" test, see Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology
and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1988); Norman G.
Poythress, Jr., Personal Responsibility in Psychiatry and the Law: A Philosophical Critique of Con-
temporary Concepts, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1985) (reviewing MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND
PsycHiATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984)). ,
8. This test requires that the defendant's actions be the direct outcome or product of
a mental disease. See Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929); State v.Jones,
50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); see also Edward de Grazia, The
Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1955) (Durham gives psychiatrists greater
power to separate the criminal and the insane); Manfred S. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as
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and the substantial capacity test from the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code.9 While the four tests vary in important aspects, they
all contain similarities. All four tests seek to (1) provide a clear standard
by which to adjudge insanity and (2) approach the theory of limited re-
sponsibility by emphasizing different aspects of the mental state neces-
sary for a determination of insanity. While not every jurisdiction allows
an affirmative defense of insanity,10 all four tests are adopted in at least
an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 325 (1955) (Durham test will foster cooperation be-
tween doctors and lawyers); Wilber G. Katz, Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will, 22 U. CHI. L. REV
397 (1955) (Durham test removes automatic presumption of free will); Philip Q. Roche,
Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 320 (1955) (crim-
inality and mental illness are interrelated and Durham test gives greater scope); Henry Wei-
hofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 356 (1955) (Durham test allows
greater scope of inquiry than M'Naghten); Gregory Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Jus-
tice, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 331 (1955) (Durham test gives doctors too much power in the
courtroom).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985). The Code reads as follows:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, 312 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinaf-
ter LAFAvE]; United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v. United
States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.
1968); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383
F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v.
United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). For a discussion of the "substantial capac-
ity" test, see Campbell, supra note 6; Denno, supra note 6; Amy L. Nelson, Recent Develop-
ments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (1991) (demonstrates availability of the insanity defense
even when legislative discretion does not create an insanity defense).
10. The following states allow insanity as an affirmative defense: ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1
(Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1987);
CALIF. EVID. CODE § 522 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3, 16-3-28 (1992); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 704-402 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1984); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 628:2 (1984 & Supp. 1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (1991); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-9-3 (Michie 1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 220.15 (McKinney 1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.01(N), 2901.05 (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.305 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 22-5-10 (1988); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 1985).
Jurisdictions that allow insanity as a defense are: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502
(1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-802 (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (1989);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210 (1988); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 651
(West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 1208 (1990); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 768.20a (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 553.040 (Vernon 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-04.1-03 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); 18 PA. CONST. STAT.
ANN. § 315 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.12.010 (West 1986); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-1 (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-304 (1991).
For states that have abolished insanity as anything other than a negation of mens rea,
see IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992).
While not codified in North Carolina or Virginia, courts in these states have held that
insanity is an affirmative defense. See State v. Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786, 795 (N.C. 1985);
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one jurisdiction. Colorado has adopted the M'Naghten test, which is the
most commonly accepted test.1 1
The M'Naghten 12 test is the accepted standard in approximately
one-half of the jurisdictions that allow the insanity defense.1 3 It states
that a defendant is not responsible 14 if the person either (1) acted under
a mental disease or defect and (2) did not know the nature and quality of
his or her act or knew the nature and quality of the act but did not know
the wrongfulness of the act. 15 While the M'Naghten test focuses on the
individual's knowledge of his or her actions, the test does not determine
what type of knowledge is required. Controversy arises over the neces-
sary distinction between cognitive knowledge and affectual or emotional
knowledge.' 6 While cognitive knowledge is intellectual and objective,
affectual knowledge focuses on the actor's ability to appreciate the im-
pact of the act on others and himself or herself. Courts' interpretations
of when an individual has actual knowledge of his or her actions ranges
from the requirement that the defendant need have only a minimal
awareness of facts 17 to the capacity to choose between acts. This
"choice" is an acknowledgement of alternatives to the action and the
action itself with a reasoning process undergone before action.18 For
example, a mother who has an urge to kill her child might know that
such an action is not appropriate and seek help to act otherwise.
However, when the defendant labors under an insane delusion such
Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934,936 (4th Cir. 1963) (Virginia). Florida courts have
held that insanity serves as a complete defense. See Davis v. State, 82 S. 822 (Fla. 1902).
11. LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 311.
12. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). M'Naghten has various acceptable
spellings, including McNaughten, M'Naughten and McNaghten. This Comment uses
M'Naghten.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) (codifying M'Naghten); LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 312. The
following states utilize the M'Naghten test in some form: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1991);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-101 (West 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (Bums 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West Supp. 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a (West
1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(b) (Supp.
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.15 (McKinney 1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Anderson Supp. 1991); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A §§ 1-
103, 6-201 (West 1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-
10 (Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-5-10 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-
501 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.12.010 (West 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-304 (1991).
The MNaghten test is established by the courts in the following cases: see Davis v.
State, 32 S. 822 (Fla. 1902); Kansas v. Smith, 574 P.2d 548 (Kan. 1977); State v. Lewis, 22
P. 241 (Nev. 1889); State v. Harris, 28 S.E.2d 232 (N.C. 1943).
14. A person who is not responsible is not criminally liable for the consequences of
his or her actions. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 317 n.70.
15. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 311.
16. Id. at 313.
17. Id. For example, an actor may have a simple memory of details of events leading
up to and including the act. See also Guttmacher, supra note 7, at 326 (knowledge test is too
restrictive for determining fitness to stand trial or in determining post-trial dispositions).
18. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 313. See THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 388 (Sa-
muel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (affective knowledge as standard);
Weihofen, supra note 7, at 358; Zilboorg, supra note 7, at 333.
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as a deific decree, 19 the perspective changes. The case is no longer sim-
ply a question of knowledge of actions and their consequences, but
rather one of compulsions and abilities to resist. According to the
judges in M'Naghten, a person operating under a delusion must "be con-
sidered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with re-
spect to which the delusion exists were real." 20 If an individual commits
a lawful act according to the facts of his or her delusion, that person is
not culpable since the reality perceived indicates the action is a legal
one. However, if he or she commits a crime according to the reality
within the individual's delusion, the court may hold him or her responsi-
ble for the act.
Several jurisdictions using the M'Naghten test also include, as either
an alternative test or as an element of the M'Naghten analysis, the irresis-
tible impulse test.21 This test focuses on the volitional aspects of the
defendant's actions and encompasses situations when the defendant
knew the action was wrong but could not control himself or herself due
to a sudden impulse or a controlling disease.22 If both M'Naghten and
this test exist in a jurisdiction as alternatives, the defendant's mental
state need only fulfill one of the tests.
23
Criminal law, with the modem inclusion of codified law and a
greater understanding of mental illness, has developed two additional
tests which combine the common law M'Naghten and irresistible impulse
tests while systematically merging new developments in treatment and
understanding of mental illness with the common law insanity defenses.
The Durham product test examines the effects of a mental disease or de-
fect alone.2 4 The American Legal Institute's Model Penal Code sub-
stantial capacity test views the individual's act in light of his or her entire
mental state or capacity.
25
The Durham product test rejects the M'Naghten test outright by in-
sisting the act be solely the product of a mental disease or defect. 26 The
act must be causally related to the disease afflicting the defendant. For
19. Other insane delusions may incorporate voices or visions recognizable only by the
person having the delusions. They may also incorporate beliefs such as people becoming
objects, objects being personified or paranoia of persecution by other individuals or
groups. See Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468 (Conn. 1988); State v. Seifert, 454 N.W.2d
346 (Wis. 1990); Roosa v. Northern Wyo. Community College Found., 753 P.2d 1028
(Wyo. 1988).
20. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 718 (1843). See Anthony Platt & Bernard L.
Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent
Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227 (1966); LAFAvE,
supra note 8, at 311.
21. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 320. The following have codified both tests: GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3 (Michie 1992); N.M. CRIM. STAT. ANN. § 14-51-2 (Michie 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992).
22. Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887); Regina v. Oxford, 173 Eng. Rep. 941
(1840). See SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 (1925); ISAAC
RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 263 (5th ed. 1871).
23. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 320.
24. Id. at 324.
25. Id. at 330.
26. Id. at 323.
19921
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instance, an individual suffering from kleptomania steals; the theft stems
from the illness itself. The defendant's mental capacity for understand-
ing the act has no bearing on the issue. The only question presented is
whether or not the act arises from some mental disease or defect. 2 7 Be-
cause insanity is comprised of multiple symptoms that may be different
in every case, this test considering the act as stemming directly from the
illness itself and not its symptoms was adopted in Durham v. United
States.28 Under this approach, the defendant is not responsible for his or
her actions if the act was a product of the person's mental disease or
defect. 29 The Durham product test is broader than either the M'Naghten
or the irresistible impulse test used alone or in combination with each
other. First, the Durham test allows greater participation in the legal
arena by medical professionals.3 0 Second, juries decide whether the ac-
tion charged in the instant proceeding is a direct consequence of the
defendant's mental illness or is simply an illegal act done by someone
who may be mentally ill.3 1 The distinction can often be discerned by the
question, "But for the illness, would the act have taken place?" If the
illness is the only reason the act took place, the actor is not accountable.
If the person's act did not occur solely because of the illness, but rather
for a reason such as revenge, he or she may still be mentally ill, but not
excused. The Durham test is not popular in the legal community because
of its perceived ability to weaken counsel's impact on a trial by appear-
ing to give both the medical community and the jury too much power
and control in the courtroom. By changing the focus of the litigation
from the legal question of responsibility to a medical question of actual
and specific mental illness, the Durham test gives additional weight and
impact to both the doctor's diagnoses and the jury's sympathies.
The American Law Institute created the most modem of the ac-
cepted insanity tests in the Model Penal Code. 32 This test combines
both the M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse tests and includes both
intellectual and affectual knowledge on the part of the defendant. The
Model Penal Code test maintains that if, because of a disease or defect
27. Id. at 323; see State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); State v.Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871)
(both cases provide that the criminal act must be a "product" of mental disease or defect).
28. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
29. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 323.
30. See de Grazia, supra note 7, at 342 (psychiatrist's input will assist the factfinder);
Guttmacher, supra note 7, at 329 (Durham test will foster cooperation between doctors and
lawyers); Roche, supra note 7, at 322 (doctors will bring greater understanding of mental
illness to the legal world); Zilboorg, supra note 7, at 333-34 (Durham test gives doctors too
much power in the courtroom).
31. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 324. See also THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 342
(Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre, Jr. eds. 1961); Herbert Wechler, The Criteria of
Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 367 (1955) (long-standing illnesses are not always
enough for insanity); Frederic Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 336 (1955).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985):
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law.
[Vol. 70:1
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(excluding psychopathic disorders),3 3 the individual lacks substantial ca-
pacity to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform
his or her conduct to the requirements of the law, that individual shall
not be held responsible for his or her actions.3 4 In determining an indi-
vidual's sanity, the defendant's alleged symptoms must be evaluated,
even when they include claims of a direct command from God.
B. The Deific Decree Doctrine
The theory behind the deific decree doctrine is that when a human
truly believes God personally commanded him or her to perform a hor-
rendous act, that person suffers from a serious mental illness. 3 5 Coinci-
dentally, those jurisdictions that follow M'Naghten have also been those
to consider the deific decree.3 6 Because the M'Naghten test inherently
focuses on the legal wrongness question of statute violation rather than
the moral wrongness question of society's perception of the act as
wrong, courts originally considered the legal wrongfulness rather than
the moral wrongfulness of the act.
3 7
It has been previously decided, however, that a defendant is no less
insane because he or she knows of the illegality of the act when there is a
deific decree.3 8 Knowledge of the laws of man may appear inconse-
quential when compared to obedience to a deity.3 9 A standard ofjudge-
ment that considers a wrong to be committed based upon simple
knowledge of an act's legal wrongness is considered too austere. Having
a mere "consciousness" or general awareness of the law's existence
would then be enough to convict a defendant, and that may not even be
necessary.40 "Ignorance of the law is no excuse;" and a lack of positive
knowledge of the law does not abolish responsibility. 4 1 With the use of
a legal standard, the doctrine of the deific decree would not exist because
33. Psychopathic disorders are those that demonstrate an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE 4.01(2)
(1985); United States v. Lawrenson, 210 F. Supp. 422 (D. Md. 1962), aft'd, 315 F.2d 612
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938 (1963).
34. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 329; Francis A. Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, 45 MAR9.. L. REv. 494 (1962).
35. State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990); People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945
(N.Y. 1915); State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989);
State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
36. The M'Naghten jurisdictions ruling on the deific decree doctrine are New Jersey,
New York and Washington. See Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1314; State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401
(NJ. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961); People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915);
Rice, 757 P.2d at 889; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650; State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash.
1983). California is the only exception as it is the only non-MNaghten jurisdiction consid-
ering the deific decree. See People v. Hudec, 213 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). See
also Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 429 (1990).
37. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945.
38. Id at 948.
39. id at 945 and 947; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
40. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d at 134 (Colo.1992). See also State v. Hamann, 285
N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979); State v. Andrews, 357 P.2d 739 (Kan. 1960); McElroy v. State,
242 S.W. 883 (Tenn. 1922); Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826 (1952).
41. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 134.
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it would not matter what the motivations were for the action; the only
important element would be whether or not the defendant knew the act
was unlawful. The occurrence of the deific decree is recognized as the
only general instance of wrong as purely moral wrong.
4 2
When the severity of the crime is great and there is a deific decree
claim, it is presumed that a defendant cannot appreciate the wrongful-
ness of the act.4 3 The evaluation of the moral awareness of the defend-
ant is important because both morals and community values are
reflected in the laws of the communities themselves. Focusing purely on
moral wrongs does, however, leave a great deal of room for personal
subjectivity to be inserted into the analysis. 4 4 All the courts evaluating
this doctrine still use societal standards for comparison, requiring that
the individual know the act is immoral according to the society's broad
value system and not the defendant's personal value system.45
The approach most used in this conflict between legal and moral
knowledge and wrongfulness is a unification of the two perspectives.
Concern does not center on violations of the laws of man or God, but
rather on the two combined. To be adjudged sane, an individual must
recognize his or her violation of the laws of both man and God.4 6 Since
recognition of what is illegal invariably gives an individual insight into
what is considered immoral in the community, one must be able to rec-
ognize both concepts in the justification of the law being violated. 4 7 De-
termining if this recognition takes place is the general approach taken by
most courts. The deific decree, however, continues to be acknowledged
as the only exception for a purely moral evaluation.
48
Jury instructions for a deific decree claim have evolved to a point
where the court may either give an instruction that does not define
wrong,4 9 thereby leaving both legal and moral wrongs as a possibility
for the jury to consider, or provide an instruction that directly includes
both legal and moral wrongs, not precluding either from considera-
tion.50 A specific jury instruction, however, is allowed in some states
only when it is claimed that the delusion subsumes the defendant's free
42. State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1322 (N.J. 1990); Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
43. People v. Hudec, 213 Cal. Rptr., 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Schmidt, 110 N.E. at
945.
44. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 137.
45. Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1322.
46. Id.; Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650
47. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 137.
48. Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1314; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
49. See cases cited supra note 45; State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889, 903 n.16 (Wash. 1988),
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989). The non-defining instruction given in Rice reads in rele-
vant part:
For a defendant to be found not guilty by reason of insanity you must find that, as
a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant's mind was affected to such an
extent that the defendant was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the acts
with which the defendant is charged or was unable to tell right from wrong with
reference to the particular acts with which the defendant is charged.
Id.
50. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650 (jury instruction's preclusion of consideration of certain
factors related to the defendant's deific decree was erroneous).
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will.- ' As with most other laws, deific decree cases must be decided on a
case-by-case basis.5 2 The deific decree doctrine does not, however, ap-
ply to instances of action based upon a set of religious beliefs or faiths.
53
In general, regularly practiced religious beliefs are not considered delu-
sional or insane delusions. They are not claimed as such by their adher-
ents54 and therefore are not protected by the insanity defense. 55 True
adherents to a religion do not claim that their beliefs are insane and
delusionary. Even though a religious tenet may seem strange to a
nonbeliever, the tenet is not seen as delusional even when it violates the
law.
The deific decree doctrine has evolved from a complete defense in
People v. Schmidt 5 6 to an affirmative defense negating the mental state
required as an element of the crime in State v. Worlock.5 7 In Schmidt, the
New York Court of Appeals did not accept that a defendant could do
something horrendous in the name of and under the command of God
and know it to be unlawful: "If, however, there is an insane delusion
that God has appeared to the defendant and ordained the commission of
a crime, we think it cannot be said of the offender that he knows the act
to be wrong."5 8 By the time Worlock was decided, courts viewed the de-
ific decree as an affirmative defense, with a religious delusion serving as
the basis for the claims.5 9 The Worlock court combined the objective
(right from wrong) aspect of the M'Naghten test with a subjective insanity
defense which depends solely on the individual's delusions.60 Fewjuris-
dictions have actually dealt with the deific decree doctrine. Washington,
California, New York and NewJersey are leaders in this doctrine's field,
as the only states dealing with the deific decree to any great degree.
Colorado first addressed the deific decree in People v. Serravo.
6 1
C. Deific Decree Case Law
The major cases dealing with the deific decree come from
M'Naghten jurisdictions. Because Colorado is another M'Naghten juris-
diction, these courts' reasonings should be persuasive in Colorado. In
fact, the Colorado Supreme Court refers to other jurisdictions utilizing
51. Rice, 757 P.2d at 889.
52. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
53. State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
54. John S. Hilbert, Comment, God in a Cage: Religion, Intent, and Criminal Law, 36
BUFF. L. REV. 701 (1987).
55. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 488.
56. 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
57. 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990).
58. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949.
59. This refers to the large number of cases in which a defendant claims to have heard
the voice of God, seen Satan in another, felt like God was on his or her side, etc. An
analysis of these claims is beyond the scope of this Comment.
60. IVorlock, 569 A.2d at 1314; State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401 (NJ. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 880 (1961).
61. Serravo II, 823 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1992).
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the M'Naghten test in varying aspects of Serravo.6 2 There are seven cases
focusing on insanity in the United States because of a deific decree as a
defense.63 All of these courts analyzed the issue from different aspects,
but each court arrived at the same two conclusions. First, each defend-
ant honestly believed God commanded him or her to do some horren-
dous act. Second, each defendant is insane. It should, therefore, make
no difference how a court approaches the insanity test. Eventually, all
courts, after hearing the evidence and understanding the doctrine,
should arrive at the same conclusion of insanity. A person who is able to
demonstrate that a deific command forced him or her to perform some
heinous act is clearly not functioning in the same reality as other mem-
bers of society. This difference should at least force a court to examine
the claim very carefully.
In People v. Schmidt,64 the defendant claimed God commanded him
to kill a woman in sacrifice. In deciding the preeminent case in the field,
the Schmidt court established a doctrine that has been consulted in al-
most every other case concerning the deific decree. The court found
that if an individual is commanded by God to act, the person may be well
aware of the illegality of the act but is blinded to the immorality of the
behavior.6 5 The overwhelming need to fulfill what is seen as a com-
mand from God makes it extremely difficult to understand how the per-
son can know that his or her actions are wrong.66 The moral duty a
citizen carries to obey the law is outweighed by the delusionary belief of
an absolute duty to God.67 The Schmidt court reasoned that a delusion-
ary individual is no less insane because he knows his acts are prohibited.
To the contrary, knowing the act is prohibited yet being unable to con-
form to the law emphasizes the degree to which the aid of the court is
needed, not its wrath.
68
State v. Di Paolo69 was decided in NewJersey, also a M'Naghtenjuris-
diction. In Di Paolo, the defendant claimed insanity. He later claimed
that he feigned insanity so that others would not know he was insane.
Following a strict interpretation of the M'Naghten test, the court evalu-
ated only the defendant's ability to appreciate the quality or nature of
his act or his knowledge of its wrongfulness, but also took the unusual
step of allowing the defense to present the defendant's entire psychiatric
62. Id. at 138. The Court discussed "wrong" as moral wrong, id. at 135, and societal
versus personal standards of morality, id at 138.
63. People v. Hudec, 213 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Worlock, 569 A.2d at
1314; Di Paolo, 168 A.2d at 401; Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945; State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889
(Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650; Crenshaw, 659
P.2d at 488.
64. 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
65. Id. at 948.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 949.
68. Id. at 948. ("Such a man is no less insane because he knows that murder is prohib-
ited by human law. Indeed, it may emphasize his insanity that, knowing the human law, he
believes that he is acting under the direct command of God.")
69. 168 A.2d 401 (NJ. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961).
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record for the jury to evaluate.7 0 While instructing the jurors to abide
by the rules established by the M'Naghter test, the court also allowed
them to consider all aspects of the defendant's past behavior and
claims. 71 The deific decree was not necessarily a turning point in the
case, but served as the focal point for the development of the defense's
case above and beyond the original M'Naghten case.
In State v. Crenshaw,7 2 the Washington Supreme Court designed the
uppermost limits of the deific decree doctrine. The defendant claimed
that, as part of his beliefs as a practicing Muscovite, 73 he was com-
manded by God to kill his wife because she had been unfaithful. 74 The
defendant claimed that the obligation to kill an unfaithful wife was a
practiced belief in his religion, and that all his acts were directly or-
dained by God. The court ruled that the defendant was not insane.
75
Reasoning that a practiced belief or religious tenet is not an insane delu-
sion, the court noted that "[s]ome notion of morality, unrelated to a
mental illness, which disagrees with the law and mores of our society is
not an insane delusion." 76 The court further noted that a tenet of a
religion is a fundamental part of practicing that religion; it is not a per-
sonal or individual command by God given specifically to the person in
question. These beliefs are not the same as insane delusions. Very few
true adherents to a religion would claim that their religious beliefs were,
in fact, delusions. 77 As courts have noted, "laws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices." s7 8 While the tenets them-
selves are not considered delusionary and are not regulated by the gov-
ernment or the courts, the outward expression of those tenets is
regulated by the law. A religious follower may believe that conducting
human sacrifices is a necessary part of worship, but the actual practice of
this belief will make the actor legally responsible, even with the religious
rationalization.7 9 The court likens this claim to that of an individual
joining a cult. Even though the value system may be different and the
duties contrary to those imposed at law, if the member chooses to act in
such a way as to violate the law, he or she is not relieved of responsibility
70. Id. at 407.
71. Id.
72. 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
73. A conservative sect of Russian Orthodoxy created in the 1478 unification of the
Muscovy and Novogrod empires. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, THE STUDY OF HISTORY 244, 372
(1947).
74. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
75. IME at 495.
76. It (citing State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401 (NJ. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880
(1961)).
77. Id. at 494.
78. Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1882) (quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S.
145 (1878)).
79. Id.; People v. Corrigan, 87 N.E. 792, 796 (N.Y. 1909). See also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (bigamy, even when recognized by the Mormon Church, is
illegal in practice in the Utah territory); People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903) (par-
ents and faith healing for their children, rather than medical care).
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before the law.8 °
State v. Cameron,8 1 citing Schmidt for the proposition that individuals
laboring under a deific decree are no more or less insane when they are
aware of the illegality of their acts. In Cameron, the defendant stabbed
his stepmother seventy times to rid her of the "evil spirit" that pos-
sessed her.8 2 In the defendant's mind, his stepmother was persecuting
him, as were Yasser Arafat and the Ayatollah Khomeni. Because of that
persecution, God ordered him, the defendant, to kill her.8 3 The Cameron
court accepted the deific decree doctrine enunciated in Schmidt, Di Paolo
and Crenshaw, and further expanded it to include the court's cognizance
of the uniqueness of each situation. The court stated that while this case
may be included in the exception created in Crenshaw, each deific decree
claim must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
8 4
Peaple v. Hudec,85 decided in California, is the sole case of the seven
cases not to arise in a M'Naghten jurisdiction. California is a Model Pe-
nal Code state, the test considered the most flexible of the four used
because of its emphasis on substantial capacity to determine right from
wrong rather than an absolute knowledge of right and wrong. In Hudec,
the defendant heard the "voice of God" for several years. For some
time, the voice commanded Hudec to kill his father to both please God
and keep the defendant from becoming a homosexual.8 6 As a Model
Penal Code state, California requires that, for sanity, the defendant ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct and have the ability to conform it
to the law.8 7 In a deific decree case, the individual is consumed by his or
her delusion and is unable to appreciate either the action or its conse-
quences. The Hudec court found that even though the defendant under-
stood the wrongfulness of his act, he could not understand its
consequences and was compelled to act on the orders of God and there-
fore was insane.
8 8
Washington courts again came to the forefront in State v. Rice.
8 9
Rice addressed specific elements of the treatment of a deific decree
claim. The court held that a ruling of insanity arising with a deific de-
cree claim may be restricted in its applicable scope. This restriction on
the procedural treatment of deific decree-based insanity provides that an
individual may be insane only if the defendant's free will is completely
subsumed by the delusion.90 If the possibility exists that the defendant
retained some control over his or her reality, the defendant is not legally
80. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
82. Id. at 652.
83. Id. at 653.
84. Id. at 654.
85. 213 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
86. Id. at 186.
87. Id. at 187.
88. Idl
89. 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989).
90. Rice, 757 P.2d at 904.
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insane, even if he acted pursuant to a deific decree. 91 In addition, a
specificjury instruction on insanity induced by deific decree is applicable
only when there is substantial evidence to support such a theory. Mere
allegations of an insane delusion will not suffice.
92
State v. Worlock,93 the most recent deific decree case prior to Serravo,
explicitly establishes the interpretation to be given to a M'Naghten test.
The court stated that "[t]he only generally recognized instance in which
a 'moral' wrong standard has provided an insanity defense is when the
defendant has killed under the delusion that he or she was acting pursu-
ant to a 'command from God'."' 94 Worlock also strengthens the argu-
ment for a judgmental standard that is guided by societal mores rather
than individual value systems and allows for jury instructions that com-
bine both "legal" and "moral" wrongs into one instruction. 95 All seven
of these cases form the foundation of the deific decree doctrine. This is
the precedent the Colorado Supreme Court should have followed in
making its decision.
D. Colorado Insanity Law
The Colorado General Assembly began its first real excursion into
the realm of legal insanity in 1951.96 Colorado's first insanity statute
combined both the M'Naghten right from wrong test and the irresistible
impulse test.9 7 Over the years, the statute changed semantically, 98 and
the statute changed substantively in 1983. 99 At that time, the legislature
removed the irresistible impulse test from the statute and added the
present Section 2, excluding psychopathic behavior from the insanity
defense. l0 0 The question of an individual's sanity is a question of fact
91. Id
92. Id.
93. 569 A.2d 1314 (NJ. 1990).
94. Id. at 1321 (citations omitted).
95. Id at 1322.
96. 1951 Colo. Laws, ch. 144, § 507(2) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-8-1(2)
(1953)).
97. The relevant text of the statute reads:
A person who is so diseased in mind at the time of the Act as to be incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that Act, or being able so to dis-
tinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease as to destroy the
will power and render him incapable of choosing the right and refraining from
doing the wrong, is not accountable; and this is true howsoever such insanity may
be manifested, whether by irresistible impulse or otherwise. But care should be
taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity, mental depravity,
or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred or other motives, and kindred
evil conditions, for when the act is induced by any of these causes the person is
accountable to the law.
Id
98. The phrase "or defective in mind" was added after every instance of "disease."
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1973).
99. In 1983, the Colorado General Assembly amended CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101
(1973) by enacting An Act Concerning Culpability for Crimes Committed While the De-
fendant is Insane or Mentally III, 1 Session Laws of Colorado, ch. 188, § 16-8-801 (1983)
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1983 Supp.).
100. The relevant text of the current statute reads:
(1) The applicable test of insanity shall be, and the jury shall be so instructed:
"A person who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission
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that must be decided by the trier of fact.' 0 '
Colorado approaches the concept of insanity in three ways: the
straightforward plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the claim of im-
paired mental capacity and the claim of "temporary" and "settled" in-
sanity. A plea of insanity is treated as any other affirmative defense.
Defense counsel is required to provide proof, to at least a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the defendant was in fact insane and did not
have the mens rea necessary to commit the crime. The rarely used or
recognized claim of impaired capacity is restricted to when the defense
is trying to show less than complete insanity as sufficient for an acquittal.
An example of such a claim is intoxication and its negation of the mens
rea needed for specific-intent crimes, such as second-degree murder.'
0 2
The largest debate in this area of the law outside the meaning of the
statute itself is the "temporary" versus "settled" insanity dispute.
"Temporary" insanity, not codified in Colorado, is usually the
product of a short-term experience with a mind-altering substance, such
as illegal drugs or prescription pharmaceuticals.10 3 The temporary in-
capabilities the defendant suffers render him or her unable to distin-
guish between right and wrong.' 0 4 The effects may be unexpected and
uncertain for the individuals themselves' 0 5 and are difficult to predict.
"Settled" insanity occurs after long-term use of a mind-altering sub-
stance. 10 6 Colorado tentatively accepted this doctrine in People v.
Bieber,10 7 stating that "an inability to distinguish between right and
wrong because of a mental infirmity derived from excessive substance
abuse should be recognized as a form of legal insanity when the mental
infirmity persists after the effects of the substance itself have dissi-
pated."' l0 8 Long-term use of barbiturates, for example, may cause brain
damage; this brain damage may be serious enough to be classified as a
mental defect and qualify for a claim of insanity.
Colorado courts are divided on how to interpret the insanity statute
itself. In People v. Serravo, the trial court recognized insanity in an indi-
of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to
that act is not accountable .. "
(2) The term "diseased or defective in mind", as used in subsection (1) of this
section, does not refer to an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1986).
101. People v. Wright, 648 P.2d 665, 668 (Colo. 1982); Palmer v. People, 424 P.2d
766, 770 (Colo. 1967).
102. People v. Cornelison, 559 P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Colo. 1977).
103. People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 625 (Colo. 1987) (defendant ingested one hundred
twenty cough drops in a twenty-four hour period and became intoxicated).
104. Id. The defendant's consumption of the one hundred twenty cough drops caused
a psychotic disorder known as "organic delusional syndrome" or "toxic psychosis" and,
according to medical testimony, the defendant was "incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong." Id.
105. Id. (Defendant was not aware of the sudden side effects of dextromethorphan
hydrobromide, the active ingredient in cough drops).
106. H. Patrick Furman, The Definition and Determination of Insanity in Colorado, 21 COLO.
LAW. 693, 694 (1992).
107. People v. Bieber, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 151, 152 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
108. Id. at 152.
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vidual who knew his act was legally wrong but believed it to be morally
right, and the appellate court agreed.10 9 The Colorado Supreme Court
disagreed, stating that the standard should be one of moral wrongs eval-
uated in comparison to society's values and norms, rather than an indi-
vidual's values." 0 Rather than focus on the purely individual or the
purely legal aspects of the case, the court chose a new approach, stating
that the acts must be judged against a standard of cognitive knowledge
of the social morals surrounding the actor.1 1 1
II. PEOPLE V. SERRAVO
A. Facts
On the evening of May 9, 1987, Serravo was out late. When he
returned home, he read a portion of the Bible and walked to his upstairs
bedroom and watched his wife sleeping. 1 12 Believing that she was an
obstacle to his divine mission to establish a religious community by con-
structing a sports complex dedicated to God,'1 3 he stabbed his wife in
the back.11 4 Serravo believed his wife passed a divine "test" because the
wounds did not kill her.' 15 He told his wife intruders stabbed her"16
and called the police and told them an intruder stabbed his wife.
117
Several weeks later, Mrs. Serravo discovered letters her husband wrote
in which he admitted stabbing her"18 while operating under a decree
from Jehovah. 19 When confronted by his wife, Serravo admitted stab-




The State charged Robert Serravo with first-degree attempted mur-
der after deliberation, 12 1 first-degree assault 12 2 and commission of
crimes of violence.' 23 Serravo pled not guilty by reason of insanity, was
acquitted' 24 and was subsequently committed to a state hospital
facility. 125
109. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 132.
110. Ia at 136-37.
111. Id. at 138.
112. Id at 130.
113. Serravo I, 797 P.2d at 782; Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 131.
114. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 130-31.
115. Serravo I at 782.
116. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130.
117. Id
118. Id. at 131 ("[o]ur marriage was severed on Mother's Day when I put the knife in
your back.").
119. Id (" 'I have gone to be with Jehovah in heaven for three and one-half days,' and
that 'I must return for there is still a great deal of work to be done'.").
120. Id.
121. Id. at 130; see also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-2-101(1) and 18-3-102(1)(a) (1986).
122. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130; see also CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-202(1)(a) (1986).
123. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130; see also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-309 (1986).
124. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130.
125. Id. at 132.
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The prosecution presented, as an expert witness, a psychiatrist who
diagnosed Serravo as having either temporal lobe/organic delusional
disorder or paranoid schizophrenia.' 26 The prosecution's doctor stated
that Serravo knew the stabbing was illegal, but believed it to be morally
justified. 12 7 Since Serravo knew the stabbing was illegal, the prosecu-
tion argued that Serravo was sane. 128 The defense presented four psy-
chiatrists and a psychologist who all testified to a diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia. 129 Examining both the legal wrongness and the moral
wrongness of the act, all the defense doctors stated they believed Ser-
ravo was unable to distinguish right from wrong. °3 0 No one disputed
the fact of Serravo's mental illness. However, the prosecution objected
to the court's jury instruction providing the insanity standards, which
stated:
As used in context of the statutory definition of insanity as a
criminal defense, the phrase "incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong" includes within its meaning the case where a per-
son appreciates that his conduct is criminal, but, because of a
mental disease or defect, believes it to be morally right.'
5 '
Believing the instruction should contain only an objective standard, the
People appealed the instruction's inclusion of a subjective moral stan-
dard and the instruction's possible interpretation by the jury as subjec-
tive-standard. 1
3 2
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, stating that
when the defendant, by reason of mental disease or defect, believed he
was inspired by God to commit an act, the phrase "incapable of distin-
guishing right from wrong" may include a person who knows the con-
duct is criminal, but believes it to be morally right.' 3 3 The appellate
court noted that the common law M'Naghten rule does not determine
whether moral wrong or legal wrong is to be considered in the standard
of judgment, and that the majority of state courts "apply a moral stan-
dard of wrong."' 3 4 The Colorado legislature determined that "wrong-
fulness" should be judged under a societal standard of moral
wrongfulness. 13 5 The appellate court recognized this legislative inten-
tion, 136 but noted that in most cases, the laws simply enunciate the so-
cial morality of that community.'
3 7
Because of this difference, the court of appeals viewed the deific
decree aspect of Serravo's case as an exception, recognized by otherju-
126. Id. at 131.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 131.
129. Id. at 131-32.
130. lE
131. Id. at 132.
132. Id. at 132-33.
133. Serravo I, 797 P.2d at 783.
134. Id.
135. Id. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1986).




risdictions,13 8 to the "knowingly legal wrong, morally right" stan-
dard.1 39 In this instance, when an individual knows some act is both
legally and morally wrong but because of mental disease or defect be-
lieves God ordered him to do it, the individual shall be found insane. 140
The deific decree does not, however, include an act performed pursuant
to a particular faith or belief system.14 1 A person acting under a deific
decree must be an individual that believes God is speaking directly to
him, personally commanding him to act. The State appealed to the Col-
orado Supreme Court on both the jury instruction and the deific decree
exception granted Serravo by the Colorado Court of Appeals. The State
further contended that the trial court's interpretation of the phrase "in-
capable of distinguishing right from wrong" was in error and inserted
the wrong standard ofjudgment into the jury deliberations.' 4 2
C. The Majority Opinion
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
State's questions concerning (1) the phrasing added to the jury instruc-
tion and the standard it created, (2) the district court's interpretation of
the phrase "incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong,"
(3) the issue of double jeopardy found in a retrial of the defendant's
sanity and (4) the deific decree exception.143 The court affirmed the court
of appeals' decision in part and reversed in part.
14 4
The court found that thejury instruction stating that the phrase "in-
capable of distinguishing right from wrong" included persons who
"know their acts are criminal but believe them to be morally right" was
improper. 14 5 This interpretation was too general and allowed for the
probability that the individual's subjective system of moral values would
become the basis of the jury's decision.14 6 The appropriate jury instruc-
tion for an insanity definition must state that "incapable of distinguish-
ing right from wrong" refers to a defendant's cognitive inabilities. 14 7
The inability to distinguish right from wrong because of a mental defect
or disease utilizes a social standard of morality even though the individ-
ual may know the act is criminal. 14 8 The fact that it is a social standard
that must be utilized must be made perfectly clear with no room for
138. iE
139. Id ("[W]e adopt an exception that has been drawn by otherjurisdictions in situa-
tions in which a person commits a criminal act, knowing it is illegal and morally wrong




142. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 130.
143. Id at 129-30.
144. Id at 130.
145. Id. at 138.
146. Id
147. Id at 138-39 ("[L]egal insanity... incorporates psychological and moral compo-
nents that are not necessarily limited by the confines of positive law .. " and therefore
needs clarifying instructions).
148. Id. (emphasis on societal standard of morality).
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ambiguity in the jurors' minds.
149
The supreme court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of
the phrase "incapable of distinguishing right from wrong." The court
held that "right" and "wrong" referred to moral wrongs as opposed to
legal wrongs. 150 These moral wrongs, however, are to be measured not
by the individual's value system, but rather by the societal value sys-
tem.15 1 Because concepts of right and wrong develop through commu-
nal experiences, to allow a standard of a personal system of values
ignores a fundamental base of social norms and values.1 52 The social
standard also allows for a more objective review of the defendant's ac-
tions. If an individual's values set the standard, there would be no cer-
tainty, objectivity or security for evaluation by the courts or society at
large. 153 If the legislature intended otherwise, the language of the stat-
ute would have better reflected its intentions, perhaps by including spe-
cific language, such as the words "individual standard."'
5 4
Regarding the threat of double jeopardy posed by a retrial of Ser-
ravo's sanity, the court ruled that even with the erroneous jury instruc-
tion, a retrial of Serravo's sanity would create double jeopardy for
Serravo. 15 5 The court reasoned that when a finding of insanity in a bi-
furcated trial negates the mens rea by eliminating the possibility of the
defendant having the required mental status needed for a crime, the
finding of insanity adjudicates the merits of the case. 15 6 When an appel-
late court determines that the evidence of a case is insufficient to sustain
the verdict, there is an adjudication on the merits because, regardless of
any trial court errors, the prosecution failed to prove the defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 7 The court noted that Colorado
courts interpret the Colorado statute more expansively than federal
courts interpret the federal statute. Once a court enters an acquittal, it
precludes a retrial, even if the trial court's errors are based on non-guilt
factors. 15 8 The same statute that allows the prosecution to appeal these
149. Id. (ambiguity may lead the jury to use a personal standard for judgment and there-
fore possibly arrive at an erroneous conclusion).
150. Id. at 137 (awareness of immorality may be impaired by illness or defect without
any effect on a "sterile awareness" of illegality).
151. Id at 137-38. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 976, 982 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See also State v. Corley, 495 P.2d 470 (Ariz. 1972); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752
(Cal. 1985); Moses v. State, 263 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980);
People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1962).
152. Serravo I, 823 P.2d at 138.
153. Id. at 137.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 140 (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"); COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 18 (No
person shall... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense").
156. Serravo 1I, 823 P.2d at 140; See Coolbroth v. District Court, 766 P.2d 670 (Colo.
1988); People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 439 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1968).
157. Serravo HI, 823 P.2d at 141 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 US 1 (1978)).
158. Id. See People v. Quintana, 634 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1981); People v. Paulsen, 601
P.2d 634 (Colo. 1979); Krutka v. Spinuzzi, 384 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1963); Menton v. Johns,
377 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1962); Castner v. People, 184 P. 387 (Colo. 1919); Roland v. People,
47 P. 269 (Colo. 1896).
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issues1 59 states that "[n]othing in this section shall authorize placing
the defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offense."
160
The final issue was the status of the de/fic decree delusion claim by
Serravo. The court held that the deific decree claim is not an exception
to the insanity test, but that it is afactor to be considered when assessing
the defendant's ability to "distinguish right from wrong." 161 If the de-
luded individual believes that God appeared and commanded the act, he
or she does not believe the act is wrong and does not meet the social
morality standard.' 62 If the deific delusion destroys the defendant's
cognitive ability to "distinguish right from wrong" as judged by a socie-
tal morality, the defendant is legally insane. 163 The jurors must con-
sider and evaluate the possibility of fraud in this situation in their roles
as the "consciences of the community."''
D. The Dissent
Justice Vollack argued that the majority erred in not considering the
language of the insanity statute 165 when it decided whether the phrase
"incapable of distinguishing right from wrong" meant moral wrong ver-
sus legal wrong. 166 The language of the statute reflects the "right from
wrong" approach of M'Naghten,167 and the language reflects the legisla-
ture's intent. The statute did not include language reflective of the
Model Penal Code test, but instead, keeps the identical language as
found in the original M'Naghten decision.' 6 8 The Colorado legislature's
refusal to adopt the Model Penal Code language entirely is obviously
intentional since Model Penal Code language can be found in Colorado
Revised Statute § 16-8-101(2), 169 which excludes psychopathic disor-
ders. In addition, Justice Vollack argued that "incapable of distinguish-
ing" demonstrates the cognitive capacity necessary for a determination
of insanity. 170 M'Naghten demands that the defendant be totally devoid
of cognitive ability, thus, "incapable of distinguishing" indicates the leg-
islature's intention that the defendant must be without any cognitive
ability.' 7 1 Under this interpretation, the defendant is not insane if he or
she is conscious of his or her act's illegality, thereby using a legal wrong-
159. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102(1) (1986).
160. ld; Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 142.
161. Serravo I1, 823 P.2d at 139.
162. l at 139, 140 (citing People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915).
163. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 140.
164. Id at 140 n. 13.
165. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101(l) (1986).
166. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 142 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
167. 1d; People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987); Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020
(Colo. 1959); M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
168. Serravo I, 823 P.2d at 144 (J. Vollack, dissenting) (the statute contains no "wrong-
fulness" or "criminality" language; only "right from wrong").
169. Id at 144 n.6 (the definition of "disease or defective in mind" is verbatim from
MPC § 4.01, see supra note 6); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101(2) (1986).
170. Serravo 11, 832 P.2d at 144 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
171. Id at 144-45; see Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); ABA MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1, at 330, 343 (1984).
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fulness standard.1 72 This standard examines only the defendant's cog-
nitive capabilities, and recognizes only those devoid of such
capacities. 173
Judge Vollack states that the issue of moral wrong is nearly moot
when examined from a common-sense perspective. Nowhere in the
original M'Naghten was the word "moral" used.174 The idea that soci-
ety's laws mirror the social morality is itself incorrect. Only some of the
moral standards become laws and, until that time, are an unreliable
test. 175 A more objective, consistent test is based upon that which has
been fixed and established as society's law.
17 6
Justice Vollack also states that the deific decree exception is a very
narrow exception recognized by few states1 77 and limited to those indi-
viduals whose free will has been overcome by their delusionary belief.' 78
In Serravo's jury instruction, the individual's religious beliefs, a subjec-
tive standard, was injected into an objective test.179 According to Jus-
tice Vollack, this directly contradicts the court's decisions concerning
criminal responsibility and the legislature's position on measuring a de-
fendant's conduct. 180
The dissent feels double jeopardy is not present in Serravo because
in a bifurcated sanity trial, the defendant is not placed in jeopardy until a
final determination of his or her guilt is reached. 18 ' This immediate lack
of concern for guilt or innocence is strongly delineated in Colorado
law.' 8 2 A bifurcated sanity trial does not address the elements of the
crimes charged, but merely addresses the defendant's state of mind at
the time of the crime. 183 The determination sought in a sanity trial is
the defendant's sanity, not guilt, innocence, possible capabilities or
potential.'
84
172. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 145 (J. Vollack, dissenting); see State v. Hamann, 285
N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979) (legal right or wrong); M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(1843); Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826 (1952) (contrary to law).
173. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 147 (J. Vollack, dissenting) (codifying M'Naghten in COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-8-101(1)); see Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987);
Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959).
174. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 146 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
175. Id. at 147.
176. Id.; see State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979).
177. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 147 (J. Vollack, dissenting); see State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d
488 (Wash. 1983), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash.
1988).
178. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 147 (citing Rice, 757 P.2d at 889).
179. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 148 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
180. Id.; see Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959).
181. Serravo I, 823 P.2d at 148-49 (J. Vollack, dissenting); see Serfass v. United States,
420 U.S. 377 (1974); People v. Paulsen, 701 P.2d 634 (Colo. 1979); State v. Rodriguez,
679 P.2d 615 (Haw. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1078 (1984).
182. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-104 (1986); see People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo.
1981).





The appellate court has adopted the deific decree doctrine as an
exception to the societal standard of moral wrong encapsulated in the
M'Naghten test. 18 5 This exception covers individuals who act knowing
that their behavior is either illegal or morally wrong according to soci-
ety's standards, but believing that God has decreed the action.1 8 6 Ser-
ravo knew at the time of the attack that the stabbing was morally wrong
and illegal, yet he still believed that God had decreed the actions.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals was in
error in classifying the deific decree doctrine as an exception to the "so-
cietal standards of morality" test.187 The court held that the doctrine
should be considered as only one factor in evaluating an individual's
cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong.' 8 8 The Colorado
Supreme Court views an individual legally insane if that person's cogni-
tive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the crime has
been destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has com-
manded the act, which is in technical agreement with the court of ap-
peals. 189 The approaches taken to the deific decree doctrine, however,
make a great deal of difference. The individual may not be able to deter-
mine the act that God commands is wrong. If that determination is not
possible, then the M'Naghten test applies and the individual cannot dis-
tinguish right from wrong. According to Cameron, however, "one who
believes that he is acting under the direct command of God is no less
insane because he nevertheless knows murder is prohibited by the laws
of man." 190 This notion stems from the fact that deific decrees contain
an additional problem not rooted in cognition. A personal command by
God to a believer will always outweigh a legal dictate imposed by man-
kind. In a believer's eyes, God would never order an act that is contrary
to the divine plan.
The Colorado Supreme Court made a grievous error when it re-
moved the deific decree doctrine from the realm of 'an exception and
made it simply another "factor" to be assessed in weighing a human
being's sanity. For a human to truly be overcome by a delusion such as a
deific decree, there must be a great deal of mental illness or devastation
inside that being. Electing to only consider delusions in pursuit of a
determination of whether a person knew the wrongfulness of his or her
actions does not accord the delusion the seriousness or respect it de-
serves. As Cameron made clear, each presented claim of a deific decree
must be evaluated individually and considered totally. 19 1 To decide
prospectively that such a claim is to be viewed as only a "factor" is to
remove some of the court's power to review the case and place emphasis
185. Serravo 1, 797 P.2d at 783.
186. Id
187. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 139.
188. Id.
189. Id at 139-40.
190. State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 654 (Wash. 1983).
191. Id.
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on that which appears most important. As the Washington court in
Schmidt pointed out, the occurrence of a divine decree may "emphasize
his insanity," for as the court stated, "If a man insanely believes that he
has a command from the Almighty to kill, it is difficult to understand
how such a man can know that it is wrong for him to do it."192 Norval
Morris' essay on Ake Dah, a Burmese Headman who thought his son was
a reincarnation of the Buddha, is most illustrative of this point. Ake Dah
said, "I have been tested and proved worthy .... I did what God com-
manded, and he spared me and spared my son .... I did what had to be
done, [what] God told me to do. You either understand ... or you do
not."
193
Across the United States the deific decree doctrine has been recog-
nized by the states that have been forced to deal with it. Until Serravo,
courts have been consistent by the continual reliance upon precedent
developed and established into a vibrant field of law. To relegate a per-
son's cognitive abilities to a back burner in pursuit of an intellectual tro-
phy is to fail to realize the full matrix of that which makes human beings
people.
Legal insanity is a mixture of things: law, medicine and morality. It
includes one additional element: humanity. People v. Serravo is a reflec-
tion pool for the various struggles and searches that are occurring in
modern-day insanity law. Courts try to determine what, of a myriad of
choices, is the best approach to use in evaluating another human's
mental processes. Courts appear to try to follow the latest develop-
ments in a quickly-growing field of law that is forced to examine the
relationships between people and their individual deities. Serravo strug-
gles with being a case of first impression in Colorado, a state not known
for groundbreaking achievements in this area of the law. The case is
relatively straightforward, except that both the appellate court and the
supreme court ruled on the different issues in question, such as the defi-
nition and importance of subjectivity, objectivity and double jeopardy,
divergently and with sometimes conflicting reasoning.
Finally, when faced with a developing field of the law, People v. Ser-
ravo does what most pools do when disturbed. It ripples gently, waiting
to be washed over by the next center of motion. It has very little effect,
carries very little weight, and is not remembered after the next distur-
bance takes place.
IV. CONCLUSION
The insanity defense is a varied and troublesome area of the law.
There are four legal tests, each focusing on a different aspect of the de-
fendant's mental state and used in different areas of the United States.
One particular doctrine found within insanity law, often controversial
192. 110 N.E. 945, 948 (N.Y. 1915) (quoting Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1881)).
193. Morris, supra note 5, at 563-64, 566.
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and always unsure, is that of the deific decree. The few cases concerning
this doctrine arise mainly in four states. Each varies widely in legal style
and emphasis. The cases, while addressing different concerns within the
doctrine, have all worked together to create a substantive body of law
with limits and accepted procedures that are workable within those juris-
dictions. Colorado's approach to general insanity law is much the same
as these states' approaches and this state could easily adopt the doctrine
as it has evolved. Colorado uses the M'Naghten test as its basis for in-
sanity decisions, as do the leading states, and could easily extend its rea-
soning along the lines established by the seven leading cases in this
field.
The Colorado Supreme Court chooses, however, to ignore the the-
ory that a person claiming and proving a deific decree for his or her act
may be more deserving of a presumption of insanity than another de-
fendant who claims general insanity. The court overruled an appellate
court that allowed the deific decree as an exception to the traditional
M'Naghten test and demanded instead that it be considered only as a
factor in the trier of fact's analysis. The dissent, however, was no better
as a champion for a rational approach to the issue. Justice Vollack
agrees with the court only when deciding that the deific decree should
not be an exception. His position is that to consider the issue at all is to
nullify the objectivity needed for the M'Naghten test. As a result there
has been no progress in Colorado's insanity or deific decree law.
People who honestly believe God personally speaks to them and
commands them to commit a heinous act are generally not sane. As
Judge Bazelton wrote in Durham v. United States, " '[o]ur collective con-
science does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.' "194
Deluded individuals are in need of legal doctrine to protect them and
provide them with the assistance they need. The Colorado Supreme
Court had a chance to assist a population in need of help with very little
effort. It is a shame the court did not seize that opportunity when it had
it.
Margaret E. Clark
194. 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (quoting Holloway v. U.S., 148 F.2d 665, 666-
67 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
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